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CASE SUMMARIES

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.
v. United States, No. 07-1601, (U.S. 2009).
Christopher M. Hirsch*

I. Background
From 1960 to 1989, Brown & Bryant, Inc. (B&B), distributed agricultural
chemicals, some of which came from Shell. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. United States, No. 07-1601, at 2 (U.S. Feb. 24 2009). With its
own equipment, B&B applied these chemicals to farms. Id. at 2. B&B
operated on a 3.9 acre parcel of land in Arvin, CA. Id. at 2. In 1975, it
expanded and began using an adjacent .9 acre piece of land owned jointly by
the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. (Railroads). Id. at 2. The
combined 4.8 acres was graded toward a sump and drainage pond at the far
corner of the property. Id. at 2. The sump and drainage pond contributed
significant contamination to the land and ground water below. Id. at 2.
Three chemicals are at issue here: Dinoseb, D-D, and Nemagon. Id. at 2.
Shell provided the D-D and Nemagon, but not the Dinoseb. Id. at 2. The
chemicals were initially stored in 55 or 30-gallon drums, but at some point in
the mid-1960's, Shell changed its policy and began to require B&B to use bulk
storage instead. Id. at 2. The delivery process allocated all risk and expense to
the seller, Shell, until the product reached its destination. Id. at 3. Leaks and
spills were a regular part of the process used to transfer the chemicals from one
storage unit to another. Id. at 3. Aware of this, Shell took action to encourage
safe handling of the chemicals. Id. at 3. Although B&B took steps to follow
Shell's advice, it was a "sloppy operator." Id. at 3.
In 1983, the Environmental protection Agency (EPA) and California
Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) investigated B&B for soil
and ground water contamination. Id. at 4. Some of the pollution threatened
potential drinking water supplies. Id. at 4. B&B took some steps to address the
issues but became insolvent and shut down in 1989. Id. at 4. Soon after, the
facility was added to the National Priority List so the DTSC and EPA could
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clean the site. Id. at 4. By 1998, $8 million was spent by the agencies to clean
the site. Id. at 4.
In 1991, the EPA ordered the Railroads to clean the portion of the site on
their land. The Railroads did so at an expense of $3 million. Id. at 4. They
then brought suit for recovery of that sum against B&B in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California. Id. at 5. That suit was later
consolidated with two suits by the agencies against Shell and the Railroads. Id.
at 5. The District Court found both Shell and the Railroads liable, but, instead
of imposing joint and several liability, it apportioned liability based on the
percentage of the contaminated area that was owned by the Railroads, the
duration of B&B's lease of that property, and the Court's determination that
only two of the three chemicals spilled there. Id. at 5. As a result of the court's
calculations, the Railroads were to be held liable for 9% of the cleanup cost and
Shell was held liable for 6%. Id. at 5.
Both agencies and Shell appealed the decision. Id. at 6. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that Shell was properly held liable, but overturned the
apportionment scheme implemented by lower court. Id. at 6-7. Finding that
the burden of proof for apportionment, which had not been met, rested with
Shell and the Railroads, the Court of Appeals imposed joint and several
liability upon both parties. Id. at 7. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine: 1) whether Shell had "arranged" for the disposal of the chemicals;
and 2) whether joint and several liability was properly imposed. Id. at 7.
II. Qualification as Potentially Responsible Parties
The first issue tackled by the Court was whether Shell and the Railroads
properly indentified as Potentially Responsible Parties (PRP) under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA). Id. at 8. Identification as a PRP carries the consequences of
bearing responsibility for cleaning contaminated areas or reimbursing the
government for cleanup costs. Id. at 8. The Court found no issue with the
classification of the Railroads as a PRP. Id. at 9. As an owner of the facility
where hazardous substances were disposed of they fell squarely within two
classes of PRP defined by CERCLA under 42 U.S.C. §§9607(a)(1) and
9607(a)(2). Id. at 8-9.
The Court spent the bulk of its time examining whether Shell qualified as
a PRP under §9607(a)(3) which defines a class of PRP as "any person who by
contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or
arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
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substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at
any facility ... containing such hazardous substances." Id. at 8. Finding that the
determination of whether one is an "arranger" must consider a wide range of
activity from simple sales of hazardous chemicals that do not contemplate their
disposal to explicit contracts for the sole purpose of hazardous waste disposal,
the Court explained that, looking beyond the parties' characterization of the
applicable arrangements, this determination can must "discern whether the
arrangement was one Congress intended to fall within CERCLA's strict liability
provisions." Id. at 9-10. Because Congress did not define the term "arranger"
in CERCLA, the Court "gave the phrase its ordinary meaning." Id. at 10. "In
common parlance, the word "arrange" implies action directed to a specific
purpose." Id. at 10. The Court refined this to say that a party "may qualify as
an arranger when it takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance."
Id. at 11.
The Government's main argument against Shell was that interpretation of
the phrase "arrange for disposal" should focus on the definition for "disposal."
Section 6903(3) of CERCLA defines "disposal" as the "discharge, deposit,
injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste into or on
any land or water." Id. at 11. The agencies contend that by including
unintentional acts such as spilling or leaking, Congress had it in mind to impose
liability on any party that engaged in sales knowing that spillage could occur in
the process of the sale. Id. at 11. Since Shell knew spillage was an
unavoidable part of its transaction, it would be liable under the government's
reading of CERCLA. Id. at 11. The Court rejected this reading because
knowledge of spillage does not prove that Shell intended to dispose of the
product. "In order to qualify as an arranger, Shell must have entered into the
sale of D-D with the intention that at least a portion of the product be disposed
of during the transfer process..." Id. at 12. The facts on record do not
demonstrate that Shell had any such intent. Id. at 12. To the contrary, they
show that Shell took steps to prevent spillage by providing safety manuals,
mandating maintenance of storage facilities, and rewarding operations that took
safety precautions with discounts. Id. at 12. Based on this, the Court held that
Shell was not liable as an arranger under §9607(a)(3). Id. at 12.
III. Apportionment for the Railroads
The Court began its analysis of the apportionment question by observing
that although CERCLA imposes strict liability on offenders, it does not require
joint and several liability for every case. Id. at 13. It found that Congress
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intended for the degree of liability to be consistent with current interpretations
of the common law. Id. at 13. Looking to §433A(1)(b) of the Second
Restatement of Torts, the Court found that "apportionment is proper when there
is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single
harm." Id. at 14 (quotation omitted). CERCLA places the burden for
demonstrating the suitability of apportionment on defendants. Id. at 14.
Because it is undisputed that the cleanup cost is capable of apportionment, the
question is whether the District Court's methodology of apportionment was
reasonably supported by the record. Id. at 15.
Both the government and the Railroads took extreme positions on
potential liability. Id. at 15-16. Since neither party briefed the District Court
on apportioning liability, the presiding judge took it upon himself to determine
the proper apportionment. Id. at 15-16. He did so by calculating the proportion
of contaminated surface area of the contaminated facility owned by the
Railroads, the relative period of time during which B&B operated on the
Railroads' property, and the proportion of chemicals that contributed to the
contamination. Id. at 16. The District Court then plugged these calculations
into a formula that resulted in 6% liability to the Railroads. Id. at 16. It figured
for a 50% error in calculations and adjusted the figure upward to 9%. Id. at 16.
The Court of Appeals assailed this methodology because the essential factors
in the equation were not capable of providing a reliable measure of contribution
to the contamination. Id. at 17. The Supreme Court found that despite these
inaccuracies, the District Court's determination was reasonable because 90% of
the pollution at the plant occurred at the sump or other locations which were
relatively distant from the Railroads' property. Id. at 17. Additionally, the 50%
margin of error factored in by the District Court should make up for any other
inaccuracies in the calculations. Id. at 18. The Court overturned the Court of
Appeals because it found that the evidence supported the District Court's
apportionment methodology, which comported with common law principles of
apportionment. Id. at 18-19.
IV. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg accepted the Governments' definition of "arranger" and
found that Shell would qualify as an arranger because of its intense
involvement in the chemical delivery and storage processes. Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States, No. 07-1601, at 1 (U.S.
Feb. 24 2009) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). Its role went beyond knowledge
because of the high degree of control it exercised in the process. Id. at 2.
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Regarding the apportionment of damages, Justice Ginsburg questioned the
District Court's decision to pursue that avenue sua sponte. She accepts the
Governments' argument that they were unaware such a course of action would
be taken and therefore were "deprived ... of a fair opportunity to respond" that
they would have had if apportionment were advanced in petitioners' arguments.
Id. at 3. Based on this position, Justice Ginsburg would have returned the
cases to the District Court so all parties could weigh in on the question of
apportionment. Id. at 4.

